Modi’s Foreign Policy and the Adani Question: A Decade of Overseas Diplomacy, Deals and Controversy
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s extensive foreign travel since 2014 has become one of the defining features of India’s contemporary diplomacy. Official records show dozens of overseas visits across Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Australia and the Americas, with economic diplomacy, infrastructure, energy, connectivity and investment consistently forming part of the agenda. At the same time, a parallel question has repeatedly emerged: did some of these diplomatic engagements create particularly favorable opportunities for the Adani Group’s international expansion?
The issue is politically sensitive because there is an important distinction between a coincidence, diplomatic facilitation and proof of preferential treatment. Available public evidence does establish that several Adani business developments occurred during periods of intensified Indian diplomatic engagement with countries where the conglomerate was seeking opportunities. But that chronology, by itself, does not establish that Modi personally secured contracts for Adani or that Indian foreign policy was designed primarily for the group’s commercial benefit.
The pattern has nevertheless attracted sustained scrutiny because Adani’s overseas expansion has covered strategically important sectors including ports, airports, electricity, coal, renewable energy and defence-related manufacturing. Reuters has documented the group’s international footprint from Australia and Israel to Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Kenya and Bangladesh.
Australia: Coal and the Early International Expansion
Australia became one of the most prominent examples of Adani’s international ambitions. The group acquired the Carmichael coal-mine project in Queensland in 2010, before Modi became prime minister, meaning the origins of this particular investment cannot be attributed to Modi’s foreign visits.
The project nevertheless became an important part of Adani’s international profile during the Modi era. After years of environmental opposition and financing difficulties, the Carmichael mine began shipping coal in 2021. Reuters reported that the project ultimately operated at a substantially reduced capacity of around 10 million tonnes annually compared with its much larger original proposal.
This is an important qualification when discussing the broader Modi-Adani relationship: not every overseas Adani investment followed a Modi visit, and some major projects clearly predated his premiership.
Bangladesh: A Major Power-Supply Relationship
Bangladesh became another significant market for the Adani Group. Modi visited Bangladesh in March 2021, while the group’s Godda power project in India’s Jharkhand state subsequently became a major source of electricity for Bangladesh.
Adani Power operates a 1,600 MW plant at Godda whose electricity is dedicated to Bangladesh. Commercial supplies began in 2023. Reuters later reported that the company reduced supplies amid a dispute over more than $800 million in unpaid dues during political turmoil in Bangladesh.
The Bangladesh relationship illustrates both sides of the debate. Supporters can point to cross-border electricity trade as an example of regional economic integration. Critics argue that the scale and structure of the arrangement deserve greater public scrutiny, particularly because the project became politically controversial after the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government.
Israel: Modi’s Historic Visit and Adani’s Haifa Port
Israel represents perhaps the most visually striking example of the debate surrounding Indian diplomacy and Adani’s international expansion.
Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Israel in 2017. India subsequently deepened its strategic relationship with Israel in areas including defence, technology, agriculture and trade.
Several years later, Adani Ports emerged as the principal Indian corporate player in Israel’s port sector. In 2023, Adani Ports and Israel’s Gadot Group acquired Haifa Port for approximately $1.2 billion, with Adani Ports holding 70% of the venture.
The transaction is strategically significant because Haifa is one of Israel’s principal maritime gateways. Adani’s participation therefore extended beyond an ordinary commercial investment into a major piece of international logistics infrastructure.
Critics frequently point to the timing of Modi’s Israel diplomacy and Adani’s subsequent Israeli expansion as evidence of a broader political-commercial alignment. Yet the available evidence does not by itself demonstrate that Modi’s 2017 visit caused or directly facilitated the Haifa transaction.
Sri Lanka: Ports, Renewable Energy and Political Controversy
Sri Lanka has generated some of the strongest controversy surrounding the relationship between Indian diplomacy and Adani’s overseas expansion.
Adani Ports became involved in the development of the West Container Terminal at Colombo Port, with the company holding a 51% stake alongside Sri Lankan and international partners. The project subsequently attracted financing from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation.
Adani also pursued renewable-energy opportunities in northern Sri Lanka. Those projects became politically sensitive, particularly after Sri Lankan officials publicly discussed pressure surrounding the proposed Mannar wind project.
The controversy intensified because India and Sri Lanka were simultaneously negotiating broader strategic questions involving energy security, maritime connectivity and Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean.
For supporters of the Indian government’s approach, encouraging Indian companies to invest in neighboring countries can strengthen India’s economic and strategic position. For critics, however, the Sri Lankan experience raises the question of whether diplomatic relationships were being used to advance the interests of a particular private conglomerate.
Singapore: Investment and Financial Connections
Singapore provides another frequently cited example, although the evidence here is more indirect.
Modi visited Singapore in 2018 as part of efforts to strengthen India’s economic relationship with the city-state. Later that month, Singapore’s state investment company Temasek invested approximately ₹1,000 crore in Adani Ports, according to an analysis published by Scroll.
The timing has attracted attention because Temasek is a major state-owned investment institution. However, there is no evidence from the publicly available material establishing that Modi’s visit directly produced the investment or that the Indian government instructed Temasek to invest in Adani.
That distinction matters. International diplomatic engagement routinely produces meetings between governments, sovereign investors and private companies. Temporal proximity alone cannot establish political favoritism.
Tanzania: From Diplomatic Engagement to Port Expansion
Tanzania provides a more recent example of the pattern critics have highlighted.
Modi hosted Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan in New Delhi in October 2023. In May 2024, Adani Ports signed a 30-year concession agreement to operate Container Terminal 2 at Dar es Salaam port.
Adani Ports also entered into an arrangement involving a 95% stake in Tanzania International Container Terminal Services. Reuters reported that Tanzania subsequently maintained its commitment to the agreements even after the U.S. indictment of Gautam Adani in 2024.
The sequence has become part of the wider debate because Adani’s Tanzanian expansion came relatively soon after high-level India-Tanzania diplomatic engagement.
Again, however, chronology should not automatically be converted into causation. Tanzania’s government publicly described the contracts as lawful and said it intended to honor them.
Kenya: The Relationship That Eventually Collapsed
Kenya may be the clearest example of both the ambition and the limits of Adani’s overseas expansion.
Adani Group companies proposed major infrastructure projects in Kenya, including a long-term arrangement involving Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and a separate power-transmission project. The proposed airport arrangement involved an investment commitment reported at around $1.85 billion.
The controversy eventually became intense, with Kenyan opposition and civil-society groups questioning the proposed airport arrangement. Following the U.S. indictment of Gautam Adani in November 2024, President William Ruto cancelled the proposed Adani airport and power-transmission arrangements. Reuters reported that the cancelled Kenyan infrastructure deals were worth more than $2.5 billion.
Kenya therefore complicates the argument that Modi’s diplomacy consistently translated into successful commercial outcomes for Adani. Some projects progressed, some remained proposals and some collapsed altogether.
Tanzania and Kenya Reveal a Larger African Strategy
The Adani Group’s interest in Africa has not been limited to individual transactions. Reuters reported in 2024 that the group was exploring as much as 10 GW of overseas hydroelectric projects in countries including Kenya, Tanzania, Nepal, Bhutan, the Philippines and Vietnam.
The group already had significant infrastructure interests in Kenya, Tanzania and other emerging markets and was examining additional opportunities in energy and infrastructure.
This suggests that Adani’s overseas strategy was broader than simply following Modi’s diplomatic itinerary. The conglomerate was pursuing a global infrastructure model based on ports, energy generation, logistics and increasingly renewable power.
Vietnam: Diplomacy Meets Commercial Ambition
Vietnam provides another example that attracted attention in 2024.
After Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh met Modi in New Delhi, he also met Gautam Adani. Vietnam subsequently indicated that Adani was considering investments in two airports, while the group had also been examining major investments in ports and renewable energy.
The proposed investments were part of Adani’s broader international expansion rather than completed transactions directly resulting from a Modi visit. Reuters reported that the group was considering a $3 billion investment in Vietnamese seaports and renewable energy, alongside airport opportunities.
Nepal and Bhutan: The Next Frontier
Adani’s international strategy has increasingly moved toward electricity and hydropower.
Reuters reported that the group was evaluating projects across Nepal and Bhutan, including a 570 MW hydropower project in Bhutan and a possible additional 700 MW development. The company’s broader objective was to develop overseas hydroelectric capacity while expanding its renewable-energy portfolio.
These developments demonstrate why the Modi-Adani debate is no longer limited to ports and airports. Energy security, renewable power and cross-border electricity transmission are becoming increasingly important parts of the conglomerate’s international strategy.
The Central Political Question: Diplomacy or Crony Capitalism?
The strongest criticism is not simply that Adani companies expanded internationally during Modi’s tenure. It is that the expansion sometimes appeared to track India’s diplomatic relationships unusually closely.
A detailed analysis by Scroll found multiple instances in which Adani projects or proposed investments followed high-level diplomatic engagement, including examples involving Singapore, Tanzania, Israel, Kenya and Vietnam.
Critics describe this as evidence of a model in which political access and diplomatic influence can provide private companies with advantages abroad.
The Indian government’s broader defense is that supporting Indian businesses abroad is a legitimate function of modern economic diplomacy. Governments routinely introduce companies to foreign leaders, help create investment environments and promote national businesses overseas. The fact that a private company subsequently wins a contract does not automatically establish corruption or favoritism.
That distinction becomes particularly important because several Adani projects were independently negotiated with foreign governments, while others never reached completion.
The Hindenburg and U.S. Indictment Changed the Debate
The controversy became significantly more serious after Hindenburg Research published allegations against the Adani Group in January 2023. The group rejected the allegations.
In November 2024, U.S. prosecutors indicted Gautam Adani and other executives over allegations involving a $265 million bribery scheme connected to power contracts in India. Adani Group denied the accusations and said it would pursue legal remedies. Reuters reported that the allegations triggered political controversy in India and contributed to international consequences, including the cancellation of Kenyan projects and reviews of other Adani-related arrangements.
The legal allegations must not be confused with proven wrongdoing. An indictment is an allegation, not a conviction, and the Adani Group has consistently denied the accusations.
But politically, the episode intensified questions about whether the extraordinary growth of the conglomerate had been accompanied by sufficient institutional safeguards and transparency.
What the Evidence Actually Shows
The strongest evidence supports a narrower conclusion than either side’s most extreme claims.
There is a demonstrable chronology connecting Modi-era diplomatic engagement with several countries and subsequent Adani investments or proposed investments in those markets. There is also extensive evidence that Adani has benefited from India’s infrastructure-focused economic environment and from the government’s broader push to promote Indian companies and strategic connectivity. Reuters reported that Adani stocks dramatically outperformed broader Indian markets between 2019 and 2024, partly reflecting investor expectations surrounding infrastructure spending.
What the publicly available evidence does not establish is that every Modi foreign visit was undertaken to benefit Adani, or that every subsequent Adani contract was personally secured by Modi.
That distinction is crucial for responsible reporting.
A Decade of Overlapping Interests
Modi’s foreign policy has sought to connect India’s strategic interests with trade, investment, energy security, ports, logistics and infrastructure. Adani’s corporate strategy has pursued almost exactly those sectors.
That creates a natural overlap.
When India strengthens relations with Israel, Adani can pursue Israeli infrastructure. When India deepens engagement with Africa, Adani can examine African ports and energy projects. When India promotes regional electricity connectivity, Adani can pursue power-generation opportunities. When India seeks stronger maritime links, Adani Ports can become a potential private-sector participant.
The question, therefore, is not simply whether Modi’s foreign visits “benefited Adani.” In several cases, they clearly coincided with opportunities that benefited the conglomerate.
The much harder question is whether those opportunities were the normal outcome of aggressive economic diplomacy or evidence of an unusually privileged relationship between political power and corporate expansion.
As of 2026, the available public record supports continued scrutiny of that question—but it does not justify presenting every foreign visit, investment or contract as proof of wrongdoing. The most defensible conclusion is that Modi’s diplomatic strategy and Adani’s international expansion have repeatedly intersected, sometimes producing major commercial opportunities, sometimes generating controversy, and in several cases ending in failure or cancellation.
The debate ultimately goes beyond one businessman or one prime minister. It concerns how India uses diplomatic power to promote private corporations, how transparent those interactions should be, and where the legitimate boundary lies between national economic diplomacy and preferential treatment of individual companies.
